The Mark Zuckerberg Interview

So how many interviews with Mark do you think you watched before tonight? Oh, to prepare? Yeah. 30 to 40. The best ones are the 04 to 06 vintage, but they're all so different. It's almost like every three to four years is a new era that is markedly different from all the previous eras. Totally. And I think we might have witnessed the beginning of a new era right in front of us on stage. Oh, yes. Absolutely. All right.

Should we do this? Let's do it. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Sit me down. Say it straight. Another story on the way. Who got the truth? Welcome to the fall 2024 season of Acquired, the podcast about great companies and the stories and playbooks behind them. I'm Ben Gilbert. I'm David Rosenthal. And we are your hosts.

Listeners, we have something very special for you today. Our interview with Mark Zuckerberg from Acquired live at Chase Center. Ooh. Mark is the iconic founder CEO of our time. And this conversation was just too good to hold on to any longer. So we are getting it out quickly before we release the full video of the entire show. Which, speaking of the full show, was utterly amazing. We had surprise appearances from Jensen Huang, Daniel Ek, Emily Chang.

And of course, we had the one and only Mike Taylor, the artist who sings, who got the truth, performing live. It was incredible. We've got basically a whole film production that's now happening behind the scenes with another 90 minutes of content beyond just this Mark interview. We should have that out in the next couple of weeks. So stay tuned for that. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to talk about a new partner of ours here on Acquired, Lagora, the agentic operating system that is redefining how the world's best legal teams work.

Yep. It's sort of obvious that AI is going to completely change the legal industry. I bet most of you listening have dropped a contract into some sort of AI chatbot out there. Lagora took that insight and asked the question, what if you really built something with that power from the ground up for the legal industry? So the founders did exactly what great founders do. Operate with obsessive customer focus. They embedded inside a massive law firm for months.

They sat with the lawyers just watching how the work really gets done. And that's how you get features that customers love, like tabular review, where you drop in a folder of hundreds of contracts and it pulls every key term into a grid a lawyer can actually work with. Lagora's bet here is interesting. Since it lets each lawyer handle more complexity, any given person can increase the quality of their work and do higher value work. And this means that the pie can grow even as each individual task takes less time.

And they recently launched Lagora Agent, offering greater intelligence and performance. The agent lets lawyers set an objective. Then it can handle the planning and the execution and delivery of the final product. Legal teams get to maintain full control and transparency since they're still involved where judgment is required. And Lagora works where you already work. You can use it within Microsoft Word while redlining or drafting. The early Lagora numbers essentially speak for themselves. When they have a head-to-head pilot with their top competitor, they win 70% of the time.

Lagora now has over 100,000 lawyers on the platform from 1,200 legal teams in 50 countries. And crazily, they went from 1 million to 100 million in ARR in about 18 months. Truly insane numbers. And that is the real test. Plenty of things demo well, but the question is whether a busy associate actually reaches for it during crunch time, or whether a partner trusts it before going into a conversation with a major client. If your legal team wants to check it out, whether you're a law firm or you're in-house at a company, you can learn more at lagora.com slash acquired and just tell them that Ben and David sent you.

As always, come discuss this afterwards with us in the Slack, acquired.fm slash Slack. And if you want to be notified when every new episode drops, sign up at acquired.fm slash email. All right. One more thing before the interview. We need to say a huge, huge thank you to the entire JPMorgan Payments team for securing the Chase Center for this, for orchestrating the entire evening. Ben and I really worked side by side all year with their incredible team to make this evening happen.

And we really got to know them. Max, Umar, Dustin, Hannah, Vinny, Nick, Amy, Carly, and so many others. It's like we were one team. You guys rock. Yeah. For the first time, we actually got to experience what it would be like if acquired was a large world-class organization and not just, you know, our little team. And what happened at Chase Center is really the physical embodiment of that. Thank you guys for being the best partners we could ever imagine.

And a very special shout out to Dustin Sedgwick, JPMorgan Payments CMO, who's a longtime listener of the show and a good friend of ours. And he's just been the driving force behind all of this. Without him, Chase Center wouldn't have happened. We're so grateful for our incredible relationship with you and all of JPMorgan. Yep. So please enjoy our conversation with Mark Zuckerberg and to take us in, the chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, Jamie Dimon. Hello, Acquired listeners.

Welcome to the Chase Center and to Acquired Live. I'm Jamie Dimon, chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase. I'm happy to kick off the show tonight and welcome all of you to one of my favorite arenas. It's been a great partnership all year between JPMorgan Payments and Acquired, storytelling and educating about some of the greatest companies in the world. For many of them, just like many of you in the crowd, we're thrilled to call you friends and partners at the firm.

Sorry I couldn't be there in person tonight, but I hope everyone enjoys the show. Ben and David, over to you. Mark. Hey. It's great to have you here. It's great to be here. You know, I was watching Jensen's video correcting the record and I was thinking to myself, we might need to book the next one of these for all the things I'm going to have to apologize for and I'm going to say tonight. Nah, just kidding.

I don't apologize anymore. We've noticed. Well, okay, wait, wait. Here's the question. If you knew what you knew today. What's up? If you knew what you know today, would you have started Facebook? Oh, God. I mean, look, I think... Coming out hot, David. Yeah, no, I mean... He started it. Literally. I think there's something to Jensen's original sentiment, which is that the entrepreneurial journey is very challenging. Especially the early days when you're running a startup and, you know, there's the sense that what you're doing could just die at any moment.

And the volatility, everything is just getting thrashed so much. And it's not... You know, you obviously look back, you have all these fond memories, but it was not the most fun part of the journey or, you know, the part of my life that I, like, wish I could go back and relive. So, I mean, I do think that there's something to what Jensen was saying that I thought was very honest. And that when I heard him say it the first time, I was like, yeah, I get that.

Right? It's like, I think there are, like, a lot of people for whom, you know, if you knew how painful it would be along the way, you wouldn't get started. But then, you know, I think that that's one of the things that's good about human nature is you can underestimate how painful things are going to be so that way you can go and do good things. Well, on that topic, we have a lot to talk about.

Yeah. I think this is actually very appropriate. First, we have to ask you about your shirt and what you're wearing. Yeah, you know, I started working with people to design some of my own clothes. And so I figure, you know, look, we're going to design eyewear. We're going to design other stuff that people wear. Let's get good at this. And so this one, I actually, I worked with this great fashion designer, Micah Miri. And he's got a great story.

So I wouldn't be surprised if you were doing one of these with him one day. And this one is, so I've kind of started working on this series of shirts with some of my favorite classical sayings on them. So this one is, pathematos, learning through suffering. It's a little family saying and also Aeschylus. Yes. Was that your family saying growing up or is that your family now? Oh, yeah. I'm just saying my sister says. Well, no, let's pull that thread.

Yeah. No pun intended, I promise. What does learning through suffering mean to you? Well, I think you learn what matters to you and what's important and kind of your place in the world through repeatedly hitting your head against different challenges. And I think that that is sort of, that's the journey, right? I mean, that's the entrepreneurial journey. It's also, I think, part of the beauty of building things. And, but, you know, this is something that Jensen talks a lot about, too, right?

It's like, I feel like you, you know, when you go to start a company, you, you know, everyone kind of writes down what they would like their values to be. But values are not what you write down on the wall. It's like your lived behaviors. And you only really learn what you care about when you have to make hard tradeoffs and face challenges. So, yeah, you learn the most important things through facing challenges. Well, speaking of facing challenges, we want to talk about a number of those because we counted, by our count, I think you have faced more existential challenges than any meaningful company in history.

Through your first 20 years. First, though. It's a dubious distinction. We will make our case to you of why and enumerate them. You're still here. But first. I kind of think my, you know, like that old Nike Michael Jordan ad where he's talking about how he's failed over and over and over again and that's how he succeeds. That one really resonates with me, too. So, thanks to you guys, I got a pair of these this summer.

And I genuinely love them. Tell us the story of how these came to be. Yeah, so. Thanks. I'm excited about them, too. So, you know, we met a we've been building social experiences for 20 years now. And originally it took the form of a website, then mobile apps. But the thing is, I never thought about us as a social media company. We're not a social app company. We are a social connection company. Right? I mean, we talk about what we're doing is building the future of human connection.

And that's not only going to be constrained over time to what you can do on a phone, right, on a small screen. So, when you think about, you know, when we got started, okay, we were like a handful of kids. You know, we weren't able, we didn't have the resources at the time to go define whatever the next computing platform is. And also, you know, Facebook originally got started around the same time as, you know, a bunch of the early smartphones and those platforms got started.

So, we didn't really get to play any role in developing that platform. And one of the big themes, I think, for the next chapter of what we do is I want to be able to build what I think are sort of the ideal experiences. Not just what you're allowed to build on some platform that someone else built, but, like, what is actually, if you can think from first principles, what is the ideal social experience? So, I think what you would like to have is not a phone that you look down at that kind of takes your attention away from the things and the people around you.

You know, not just a small screen. I think what you ideally have is glasses. And through the glasses, there's one part of it where the glasses, they can see what you see and they can hear what you hear. And in doing so, they can be kind of the perfect AI assistant for you because they have context on what you're doing. But then part of that is also that the glasses can project images, basically like holograms, out into the world.

And that way your social experiences with other people aren't constrained to these little interactions you can have on a phone screen. You know, in the not-so-distant future, you can imagine, because you guys have demoed some of the stuff that we've done, like a version of this where we're having a conversation like this, but, you know, maybe, like, one of us isn't even here. They're just like a hologram and we have glasses. And it really, there's the question of delivering a realistic sense of presence.

There's something magical in the realm of building social experiences around the feeling of human presence and, like, being there with another person and this physical perception, right, where, you know, we're very physical beings, right? People like to intellectualize everything, but a lot of our experience is very physical. And this physical sense of presence that you are with another person doing things in the physical world is something that you're going to be able to do through holograms, through glasses, without being taken away from, you know, whatever else you're doing, just kind of have that mixed in with the rest of the world.

It's going to be, I think, the ultimate digital social experience. And I think it's also going to be the ultimate incarnation of AI because you're going to have conversations where it's like, all right, there's some people. It's like maybe, like, I'm physically here. There's, like, a person. You're, like, a hologram there. There's an AI that is kind of embodied as someone is there. And the glasses will enable this. So, okay, so how are we going after this, building this?

This is, like, some huge project. We've been working on it for 10 years. And there are a lot of different challenges to solve to get there. There's, like, you have to build a novel display stack, right? It's not, these aren't just screens, like, the kind that are in phones. There's this long lineage. They're connected to the screens that have been in TVs and monitors and things for a long time. There's been this massive optimization of the supply chain.

There's, like, brand-new display stack around holographic displays that basically need to get created. And then they need to be put into glasses. They need to be miniaturized. And you also, in the glasses, need to fit chips, microphones, you know, speakers, cameras, eye tracking to be able to understand what you're doing, batteries to make it last all day. Operate on new novel RF protocols. Yeah, it's, like, okay, it's a pretty big challenge. So, we're, like, all right, let's go try to go for the big thing, right?

And we've been working on that for a while, and we're pretty close to being able to show off kind of the first prototype that we have of that, and I'm really excited about that. At the same time, we also came at it from this lens of, all right, so that's, like, a lot of new technology that needs to get developed, a lot to pack into a form factor, because the glasses have to be good-looking, too. So, what if we just constrain ourselves to, like, we're going to work with a great partner, Esselor Luxottica.

They make Ray-Ban. They make a lot of the iconic glasses. Let's see what we can fit into glasses today and make them as useful as possible. And, you know, I actually, I kind of thought when we were getting started with those that it was almost like a practice project for, like, for the ultimate AR. Which, let's be clear, that's what you thought Facebook was. That's true. That's true. Yeah, it did. Like, for your real startup someday.

That's true. Yeah, no, this is, yeah, let's go on a tangent there for a second. So, I started Facebook in school, came out to Silicon Valley with Dustin and a handful of people working on it at the time, and we did that because Silicon Valley is where all the startups came from. And I remember we got off the plane, we were driving down 101, we're like, wow, eBay, Yahoo, like, this is amazing. All these great companies.

One day, maybe we'll build a company like this. And I'd already started Facebook. And I was like, surely the project that we're working on now is not a company. And Facebook had, like, some scale at this point. Oh, no, no, it was a great project. I just didn't have the ambition to turn it into a company at the time. That just kind of happened. But, anyway. Yeah, I mean, a lot of hard work, obviously. But I just, at the time, I was kind of like, yeah, no, I don't think this is it.

Well, that's your answer of would you have started. You actually didn't try to start Facebook. I didn't know. So, yeah. So, I mean, the glasses, though, you know, we thought that this was like, all right, we want to get working with SLR Luxottica so we can start building more and more advanced glasses. And then, you know, they're really good. They look good. And then AI, like the massive transformation in AI. So, for listeners, let's just be really clear.

You guys shipped this product that I'm holding before LLMs, or at least before the public consciousness was aware of, you know, the chat GPT moment. And these were not manufactured and shipped as an AI device. That came later when they were already in market. Yeah, a few years ago, I would have predicted that AR holograms would have been available before kind of like full-scale AI. And now I think it's probably going to be the other order.

So, now it's like, all right, great. Well, this is actually a great product because it's got the cameras so it can see what you see. It's got the microphone. It's got the speakers. You can talk to it. I remember calling Alex Himmel, the guy who runs the product group. That's exactly the story. And I'm like, hey, you know, I think we should probably pivot this and make it so that meta AI is the primary feature of it.

And then, like, I remember I came in the next week and they'd build a prototype of it on Tuesday. And it was like, all right, good. Yeah, no, this is good. This is going to be a very successful product. He told us a much more high-stakes version of that story. I was like, so I was on the highway with my kids and I get this call on a Saturday from Mark and he's like, those glasses, could we put meta AI in them running on device and, like, ship that soon so we can see if that's a good idea or not?

Yeah, that tracks. That's what I just said. Sounds right. All right, listeners, now is a great time to tell you about a longtime friend of the show, Vanta. AI has scrambled the whole security picture. It used to be that you proved that you were secure once a year on audit or a static PDF. Then everyone would nod and you're done. But in an AI-first world, that doesn't hold up anymore. Yep, your risk surface changes every week now.

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Okay, so thank you for opening up with a story. The question that I would like to try to answer tonight is why has Meta worked as spectacularly well as it has? I mean, one of the most valuable companies in the world through multiple iterations, multiple technology waves fighting off, you know, maybe let's name all the waves in which people said, oh, Facebook and Meta are so screwed. And yet that is not the way it looks today.

MySpace, Twitter Gen 1, Instagram, Snapchat, WhatsApp, TikTok. Apple, Apple. ATT. Tracking transparency. You could put in its own whole category. And now ChatGPT. That's mine. And, like, there is a widely held public narrative every single time Snapchat discovers stories or there's something where people are like, oh, the cool thing that Facebook, the company, did is just obsolete now and they're going to go away. You very much haven't gone away. What do you think is the through line of the DNA of the company that allows you to keep winning?

I think it's that we're a technology company that is focused on human connection, not a specific type of app. So, like, we never thought about ourselves as a website or a social network or anything like that. For me, building this kind of glasses to enable the future of people being able to feel present with another person no matter where they actually physically are is the natural continuation of the kind of apps that we build today. But it depends on how you define what you are.

And then you need to figure out, well, how do you build, how do you give yourself the competence to actually go do that? And that's where I think being a strong technology company comes in. Because, you know, a lot of companies, I think, think about themselves too narrowly in terms of, okay, well, we're this kind of one thing. And the reason why we can build all these things is because we have a really strong technology foundation.

And some of that is just me and how I think about stuff. I mean, I was an engineer before I got started. I mean, I, like, mostly took, like, systems engineering type classes when I was in college. So, you know, you talk about, like, Friendster and MySpace and all the scaling challenges they had doing the graph calculations of, like, all right, do you know this person? Should you show them their page? Yeah. Yeah, actually, can you take us back?

And, like, we want to ask you the story of that time. I mean, it seems quaint now, Friendster, MySpace, but you study computer science, graph networking, social graphs. That is a very, very difficult computational calculation. So I think it's a combination of a product question and a technology question. I think you can define the product in such a general way that the technology becomes basically impossible to solve. So you want to have a smart product definition, but then you want to be competent and better than everyone else at the technology.

And I think that that's something that we've held ourselves to and build a good organization around. And it's one of the things that I observed as soon as I came out to the Valley, that all these companies that called themselves technology companies were not really set up that way. Right. Like, the companies I was talking about, it's like, they, you know, the CEO wasn't technical. The board of directors had no one technical on it. They had, like, one dude on the management team who was the head of engineering who was technical and, like, everyone else wasn't.

And it's like, all right, if that's your team, then you're not a technology company. So I think one of the things that I've always been pretty careful about is I actually, like, want, like, a lot of the people on our management team, it's like, you know, splits mostly people running either of these big product groups who come up through different technical pathways at the company. And I think that there's, like, a balance, right? It's like, you don't want everyone to be an engineer because there's other things that matter, too.

But if you don't have enough of your kind of share of the company as engineers, then you're not a technology company. And I think that that also is important to the board. And I think just, like, in terms of how you weigh decisions and culturally things inside the company matters a lot. But I think that that's one of the things that has been really fundamental, right? It's like we're able to kind of go from platform to platform and do these different things because we've invested and cared about the underlying technology.

The product experiences that we build on top of that are an implementation, and they matter. And for that, I think, we also, I think, are a pretty curious and learning-focused organization where, you know, I view the product strategy less as any one specific thing and more as how do we iterate and learn as quickly as possible how to make each thing better for the people we're trying to serve. Right? So, like, I define our strategy as if we can learn faster than every other company, we're going to win.

We're going to build a better product than everyone else because we're going to get it out first or early. We're going to have a good feedback loop. We're going to get a bunch of feedback. We're going to learn what people like better than other people. And then over time, by the time you get to, you know, whether it's version 3 or 4 or 5, I mean, they're not even discrete versions because you ship so frequently. It's, you just, you learn faster.

So, I think that's basically the formula. Yeah. Be a technology company. Build good foundation. Like, learn from what people are kind of focused on in the world and just iterate as quickly as you can. In one of my research calls to prep for this, someone described you as a master strategist, which, like, it's, we all sort of acknowledge that at this point. But that the... I mean, except for, like, all the stuff that I just thought was not going to be that important that ended up actually being the most important.

It's... But you're very generous. But that's the thing. Part of it is, like, okay, you want to set up the game so that way you optimize, you create your luck. This is what Jensen told us. Like, the apple's going to fall from the tree in some direction. And if you just set up the game, that you have a hand close enough to catch it. The comment that someone made to me was, the reason Mark is such a good strategist is because he plays the company as if it's a turn-based strategy game.

And he just makes sure he gets more turns than anybody else. And he makes sure that he learns more from each turn than the next player does. Do you feel like that encapsulates, like, meta product development? Strategy game. But it does kind of feel like the way that you make bets is, like, I... Well, if we have great engineering, then that can kind of take care of the speed part. That's, like, you know, many iterations or multiple at-bats.

And then the... Well, great engineering and speed and iteration are actually two different values. They're not necessarily at odds, but I think, like, there are a lot of great engineering organizations that try to build things that are super high quality and have good competence around that. But, I don't know, there's a certain personality that goes with kind of taking your stuff and putting it out there before it's fully polished. And, look, I'm not saying that our strategy or approach on this is the only one that works.

I think in a lot of ways we're, like, the opposite of Apple. And clearly their stuff has worked really well, too. Right? But, I mean, they take this approach. It's, like, we're going to take, like, a long time. We're going to polish it. We're going to put it out. And maybe for the stuff that they're doing that works. Maybe that just fits with their culture. But for us, I think that there are a lot of conversations that we have internally where you're almost at the line of being embarrassed about what you put out.

Because you, you know, obviously not in the sense that it's, like, you know, you want to put stuff out early enough so you can get good feedback. You obviously want to test things that are reasonable hypotheses. So, if it's, like, so ineffective, then you're not testing a good hypothesis. That doesn't work. But I do think a lot of the conversations that we have are, like, okay, well, we can get this to be a lot better if we work on it for, like, another couple of months or whatever.

And I do just think that, like, you want to really have a culture that values shipping and getting things out and getting feedback more than needing always to get great positive accolades from people when you put stuff out. Because I think, like, if you want to wait until you get praised all the time, you're missing a bunch of the time when you could have learned a bunch of useful stuff and then incorporated that into the next version you were going to ship.

And it's just about making sure that what the thing that the company is known for or its brand can withstand all the little damage that you do to it by shipping stuff that's not quite ready. Well, I would like to hope that it's not damaging to the brand. But, um... Well, but innately, it is. It's like when you're like, oh, I feel bad because I shipped a product that wasn't good enough. You're sort of... Yeah, no, I don't want to overstate it.

I mean, we don't ship things that we think are bad. But we also don't take... We want to make sure that we're shipping things that are kind of early enough that we can get good feedback to see what they're going to be most used for. Like, I think a lot of the AI stuff that we're building now, for example, it actually... You know, it's pretty clear that AI is going to be transformative for a lot of different things.

It is actually less clear what are going to be the initial use cases for a lot of these things that are super valuable. And so, okay, part of it is like, okay, you put something out. You want to kind of collect feedback and what people are actually... What it's... You know, where it's resonating. Now, if what you put out is bad, then you're not going to collect good data because people aren't going to use it for anything because it sucks.

So... But I do think that you have hypotheses for what people might really want to use it for. And they're not all going to be right. And you want to kind of go early enough on that as more. Yeah. So I'm building to this question of... To you, is product creation an act of invention or discovery? Like, is David always inside that marble? And you just need the very best tooling and ability to get things in market and get feedback to discover the statue of David?

Or do you conceive of David in your head and I'm like, I'm going to make this and put it in the world? Does it have to be one or the other? I mean, I think it's a combination. I think you're basically taking some kind of values, either kind of, like, values that you have or a value for something that you believe should exist in the world and trying to build something that's aligned with that while trying to match it up with what is going to resonate the most with people.

Right? I think if you just do the latter, then I think you just don't have enough conviction to see through hard things. And if you just do the former, then you probably don't get to product market fit or optimize what you do because you're not focused enough on your customers. So I think both probably matter. Yeah. As I pour through all these historical examples, there's, like, the market discovers, some other participant in the market discovers the stories format.

And suddenly the whole world is like, oh, my God, that is the way that we all, that's the social interaction mechanism. And that's, like, a pretty pure discovery where you have products that have stories. They perform very well. That's been discovered. But there's other times it feels like everything you're trying to do in reality labs, all, you know, 50-plus billion dollars that you've put into it, is, like, we're going to freaking will this thing into existence because I have an idea of the way that I want the world to be.

I'm not really, like, asking for that much feedback. I'm putting it in the world. Well, it's a combination. I mean, I think that there's certainly a lot of things that we've invented or created for the first time. I mean, like, in 2006 when we built the first version of News Feed, right, the, like, before that, social networks were basically profiles. And then we were like, hey, like, people actually kind of want to get the updates. And let's, like, show them that.

And if we rank them, then we can, you know, there's so many updates that this can help people parse through that quickly. And today it's, like, hard to imagine any social product without a feed. So I think that that's obviously there's some of these things are sort of seminal, I don't want to call it an invention, but, like, patterns that we basically established first. And then some of them are ones that other people did where we take pride in learning from what is working in the world.

You know, we're not embarrassed about learning from things that other people, like, discovered that were good first. And then we build a better version of it. And, I mean, I think that that's, you know, no one company is going to invent everything, right? I think if you don't invent anything, then it's hard to kind of be a successful company. But I do think that there's a mix of this. There are more smart people outside of your company than inside your company.

If you're not learning from what's going on in the market, then you're missing a lot of opportunities to get valuable signal from people in the community and customers about what they want you to be doing. Right. Which speaks to the thesis of Facebook as a technology company. Meta. Meta is a technology company. We'll get to that later. Ben and I have been having a conversation. I want to take this to open source and open source technology and its importance to you.

And Ben posited, first to me and then to many other people in our calls over the last couple weeks, that Meta has been the largest beneficiary of open source technology in the modern world. And I'm curious if you would agree with that and if you would comment on your relationship to open source. I think almost all of the major technology companies at this point are primarily using open source stacks. So, yeah, I mean, I don't know.

We wouldn't have been able to get built without open source. I think probably that's true for any new company that's been created since, like, I don't know, the late 1990s or something. For us, open source has been important and valuable. I mean, you were the first big company built on the LAMP stack. Yeah. Yeah. No, and it's great. It makes it super easy to develop stuff quickly and iterate quickly. But we've also had an interesting relationship with this because sequentially as a company, we came after Google.

So Google was the first of the great companies that built this distributed computing infrastructure. So they came first. They were like, all right, let's keep this proprietary because it's a big advantage for us. And then we're like, all right, we need that too. But we built it. And then we're like, okay, not an advantage for us because Google already has that. So we might as well just make it open. And by making it open, then you basically get this whole community of people building around it.

So it wasn't going to help us compete with Google for any of the stuff that we were doing to have that technology. But what we were able to do with things like open compute were get it to become the industry standard. So now you have like all these other cloud service platforms that basically use open compute. And because of that, the supply chain is standardized around our designs, which means that it's like way more supply, way cheaper to produce.

We've saved billions of dollars. And the quality of the stuff that we get to use goes up. So, all right, that's like a win-win. But I think in order for this to work, we do a lot of open source stuff. We do a lot of closed source stuff. I'm not like a zealot on this. I think open source is very valuable. But I also think it sort of makes sense for us because of our position in the market.

And the same for AI. I'm in Iran. Okay. This is where we were going with this. Yeah. It's a similar deal. We want to make sure that we have access to a leading AI model. I think just like we want to build the hardware so that we can build the best social experiences for the next 20 years, I don't think that, you know, for us, it's like we've just been, we've been through too much stuff with the other platforms to fully depend on anyone else.

And we're a big enough company at this point that like we don't have to, right? We can build our own core technology platforms, whether that's going to be AR glasses or mixed reality or AI. So I think that's somewhat of an imperative for us to go do that. But, you know, these things are not like pieces of software that are monolithic. They're ecosystems. They get better when other people use them. So for us, there's a huge amount of good.

And it philosophically lines up with where we are. We're like, I mean, look, I definitely, you know, firsthand have a lot of experiences. We were like trying to build stuff on mobile platforms. The platforms are just like, nah, you can't build that. Okay. That's frustrating. Can we take a real quick detour? What's up? I really want to ask you something. We can take a detour. Okay. You took a detour. We're going to take a detour. Help us with our research here.

The eve of the IPO. Okay. This is quite a detour. Wait. Quite a detour. David, you, did you just. I really am grabbing the wheel here. Is this connected or did you just decide that it was your turn to talk? I'm sorry. I was like really like wound up. I know. Open source and AI. We'll get back. It's like it's going to be tough to get back to this. I think it's related. I do. I really genuinely do.

Facebook on mobile is HTML5. Uh-huh. In 2012. May 2012. Yeah. Yeah. I want to ask you what you were thinking going into the IPO with Facebook on mobile being HTML5. And what happened to IPO at $100 billion market cap over the next three months? You have a 50% drawdown. Probably because of that. Uh-huh. But I guess the related question to what we're talking about now is how much is that informing your approach here with AI? It was a pretty different technical issue.

So, I mean, our legacy was building on web for websites. And we were very used to building one thing and being able to continuously deploy it. And it fits with our iteration style and all that. So, now all of a sudden this like app model comes along. And it's like we have to build like different ones for each phone. And like you have to go through approval to get it shipped. Do we have to wait like weeks before it can ship?

It's like this sucks. So, we're like, all right. We have an idea. Let's build this platform where we can get a web-based platform. So, you basically build a native shell and you build this web-based platform in it. And we'll be able to just update our apps every day. And we'll ship one thing once. And we'll update our apps across Android and iPhone and Blackberry and Windows Mobile and all the stuff that existed at the time because it hadn't gotten consolidated yet.

And we're like, that's going to be, that's, we're like basically whatever downside we are going to have from not having the most native thing, we're going to make up for in velocity. And by having like way more of our energy focused on one platform. Well, we were wrong. It turned out that, you know, having the native integration was actually critical for having the interactions feel good. And that, so we basically went through this period where we had to go rewrite our apps from scratch.

And that coincided with mobile growing dramatically. And mobile, we didn't have any revenue. Because it may seem like it's pretty similar, but there's a very big difference. On desktop, you basically have the app and you have a column on the side that we could put ads. And on mobile, we needed to figure out what does it mean to put ads into the experience. Right? Like, let's be clear, the feed ad had not been invented yet. Like, the ad unit of our time.

Yeah, that was the thing that the team did. Yeah. And it's, and like advertisers have like specific formats that they like working with. And the idea that we were just going to be like, all right, now your ad is going to look like a feed story was a big challenge for advertisers. And the idea that now for people, you were going to have this organic feed that was the most important part of the product. And now we're just going to start putting ads in it was a challenge for the people who are using the product.

So we needed to figure that out and we need to get the apps to be better. And we basically took, I think it must have been like a year or something. We were just like, look, we're going to pause feature development of the company because it's hard enough to do a rewrite. Right? So if you look at like the history of the tech industry, there are all these examples like Netscape and, you know, these things that like they tried to do a rewrite.

They needed to reestablish their technical platform. And they also tried to add features. They basically just like never terminated. So that's a real risk, right? When you're like completely changing your underlying platform that you're going to miss it. It was like, all right, we've got to minimize the chance that that happens. So we're not going to ship any new features. We're just going to rewrite it, make it faster. But while we're doing this, like basically mobile is growing.

So the percent of our traffic that is monetizable is shrinking because web is basically shrinking and mobile is growing. And that's your only business model. Yeah. And I was like, all right. And you're now recently quarterly reporting. You know, but the thing is, it was actually pretty clear what we needed to do. You know, I think strategically, a lot of the time it's somewhat harder to know what to do when you're winning. Like when stuff is going well, it's like, what is the next move to like go from winning to winning more?

But when you're losing, it's usually pretty clear what you have to do. And I think a lot of it is like, is just, do you have the pain tolerance to go do it? So a lot of this was like, all right, the team was like, okay. Okay. Well, we're going public and, you know, it's investors really aren't going to like this if we are like not making money for a year and a half. And it's like, well, a year and a half is short in the grand scheme of things.

Let's do this. And we did it. And it was a painful year and a half. And then we came out of that and we were in great shape. So I think like people inside the company, it felt a lot better sooner because it was pretty clear to people that we were doing the right thing. And they knew that we were executing in a responsible way and basically focused and we're doing the right thing. But I think it's actually when you have something that's working well and you're on one local hill and you need to jump to another hill, that's the stuff that's really culturally hard.

But this one I think was, it was not fun. There have been a period, a series of periods throughout the company that were not, I don't know, not the most fun periods. But although that one in retrospect is, you know, looks pretty good in retrospect. It's like, not that bad. It's like your market cap only got cut in half for a year and a half. Like, great. Great. Yeah, I'll take that. All right, listeners. Now is a great time to thank our longtime friend of the show, ServiceNow.

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If you were to be self-critical of your own company, of your own creation, of all the criticisms that have happened over the years, which do you believe is the most legitimate and why? I mean, there's so many things that we've messed up, that there are many criticisms that are legitimate. But if that was a year and a half mistake, I think, you know, one of the things I reflect on over the last like 10 years or so was, you know, the political environment just changed dramatically, right?

It's like before 2016, there was like not a month that went by except for maybe this IPO period where the sentiment about the company was anything but positive. And then after 2016, after the election, basically there was not a month for a while where the sentiment about the company was positive. And we, I think so much of this stuff is correctly understanding your place in the world and in history. And, you know, so I think, you know, we talked about before how it's like, I think we understood that we are a technology company and that you have to be a technology company to build this kind of thing.

I think we understood that we're not a social network company, we're a human connection company and that will take different forms over time. The political environment, I think, I didn't have much sophistication around and I think I just fundamentally misdiagnosed the problem. So I think that there was this basic challenge and there were a lot of things. I don't want to simplify this too much. I mean, there were a lot of things that we did wrong.

There were some things that we did right. But I think one of the things that I look back on regret is I think we accepted other people's view of some of the things that, you know, they were asserting that we were doing wrong or were responsible for that I don't actually think we were. And, you know, that's, it's, there were a lot of things we did mess up and we needed to fix. But I think that there's this view where when you're a company and someone says that there's an issue, I think the right instinct is to like take ownership for it.

Right? Say like, okay, like maybe, maybe it's not like, maybe it's not all our thing, but we're going to fully own this problem. We're going to take responsibility for it. We're going to fix it. But when it's a political problem, I actually think a lot of the time, sometimes there are people who are operating in good faith who are identifying a problem that wants something to be fixed. And there are people who are just looking for someone to blame.

And I think to some degree, if you, if you take responsibility for things, because you think it's a corporate crisis, not a political crisis, and your view is like, okay, I'm like, I'm going to take responsibility for all this stuff. Like people are basically like, like blaming social media and the tech industry for like all these different things in society. And if we're saying, okay, we're going to really like do our part to go fixes like this stuff.

I know there were a bunch of people who just took that and were like, oh, you're taking responsibility for that. Let me like kick you for more stuff. And honestly, I think we should have been firmer about and clearer about which of the things we actually felt like we had a part in and which ones we didn't. And my guess is if the IPO was a year and a half mistake, I think that the political miscalculation was a 20-year mistake.

And so it started in 2016. And I think that we have been working super hard to fix a lot of issues and to figure out kind of what the right tone is for navigating what is a very kind of fraught political dynamic across both the country and multiplied across all these places around the world. And I think we've sort of found our footing on like what the principles are, like where we think we need to improve stuff, but where people make allegations about the impact of the tech industry or our company, which are just not founded in any fact, that I think we should push back on harder.

And I think it's going to take another 10 years or so for us to kind of fully work through that cycle before our brand and all of that is back to kind of the place that it maybe could have been if I hadn't messed that up in the first place. So, but look, in the grand scheme of things, 20 years isn't that bad either. And we'll get through it. And I think we'll come out stronger. But I do think that is one of the kind of more interesting critiques that I think people get.

And we get critiques on both sides on that. There are people who don't think we've taken enough responsibility. But I think certainly there's one line of critique, which is, you know, you kind of bought into too much of the stuff that you shouldn't have. And, yeah, I think it's going to take us a long time to dig out of that. Do you have a reasonable framework at this point for like, okay, here's the stuff where I feel like we actually do want to take responsibility for it.

And here's the stuff where like, no, that's not our fault. Yeah. I mean, at this point, I think a lot of this stuff has been studied. So, I mean, I don't want to go rehash all the different things. But I think at this point there's been like years of academic research on a lot of these things. And, you know, part of the thing that's challenging is, and one of the things that we've learned is we actually should be trying to support more academics and doing more of this research ahead of time.

Because like when you get to a point where you're being kind of accused of something, you're not super credible just standing up yourself and being like, I don't think we did this one. You know, it's like, but what has worked over time is like, you know, you do the research in advance and you get kind of third party academics, respected folks who get to debate all these different issues. And then it's like, oh, no, actually, like the evidence just does not show that social media is correlated with this kind of harm at all.

So, I think that like, or it's, you know, so I think that that's, I think that it kind of cuts both ways. To me, this brings up another topic we wanted to talk about with you. And you just, you know, 20 years isn't that long. I'm young. You're young. We all are. This is the advantage of being a college dropout founder. Yeah, no, it is. When you start when you're 19, it's like, hopefully we have more than 20 years left.

And hopefully you have like Buffett duration. Yeah. Hopefully. You set up the company in a, especially at the time, truly unique way where you can operate the company and take that, you know, take that approach. Do you mean super voting shares? Super voting shares is like, you know, the technical aspect. I think there are a bunch of technical aspects to it that we're not going to get into in this conversation. But effectively, you can take that perspective in a way that if you are a CEO, non-founder, you know, without a structure that you've set up, you just can't.

And I think, you know, in doing all the research for this, a thesis we've developed is that, like, that is just one of the core fundamental advantages that Meta has. So as you were setting up the company, you know, when you were so young, even when you went public, you were so young, like, why was that so important to you? Well, in 2006, Yahoo wanted to buy the company for a billion dollars, and everyone on our management team wanted to sell it.

And the board tried to fire me. And everyone, and basically in the next year, everyone else on the management team left because they, I hadn't done a good job communicating. I mean, I don't want to blame them. Like, I hadn't done a good job communicating the long-term vision because I didn't, I wasn't thinking about that at the time. I, like, wasn't thinking in terms of this as a company. I was like, this is a great project.

It's awesome. Like, a lot of people like what we're doing. I think this will probably continue for a while. I think it's going to be pretty important in the world. But I didn't, like, know how to think in terms of, you know, like, long-term financial plans or... Like, make the case to them why it would be worth more than a billion. Yeah, yeah. Or just like, look, we're doing this for the long term. We're not planning on selling the company.

So it's like, without having made that case, it was understandable that basically Yahoo comes around, a lot of people, it's like, this is like all their startup dreams come true. You've got to take this offer. Because I, like, I just wasn't in a place where I had the sophistication to basically articulate a lot of the stuff around where we were going longer term. It probably wasn't super confidence-inspiring to them when I was like, hey, I think we should turn this down because we're going to do this.

So after that, it's like, all right, well, I don't want to get fired from my own company for wanting to build it. So let's try to set up a governance structure that makes it somewhat harder to do that. So learning through suffering. Wow. And being very cash-generated and very early, such that you had a very real going concern on your hands, and you just didn't need to cut off your arm and sell it to someone in order to build your business.

Yeah. Totally. I think this is a fundamentally misunderstood thing about Facebook the startup. It is the prototypical startup. You are the iconic startup founder. Of this century. And there's a lot of people that want to start a startup for a lot of the glamorous reasons of starting a startup. You hated being a startup and wanted to stop being a startup as fast as possible and be a, like, going concern. Yeah, I mean, I think we're having a lot more fun now.

If I get to work on all the stuff, it's awesome. But what is your advice to all these founders who sort of romanticize the idea of starting a company and kind of raising all this money? Obviously, starting a company is not bad, right? I mean, I think that there's different schools of thought on how to do it. I think some people think, okay, I want to go start a company, so I'm going to, like, go dive into this idea.

And I just think that that's a little bit dangerous because there's this issue, which is you have to be able to be nimble and pivot around until you can, like, figure out what works, right? It's, I mean, part of the reason why I didn't think Facebook was going to be the company early on was because when I was in school, I built, like, 12 different things, right? That were just things that I wanted to exist. And I was like, all right, this is fun.

Okay, let's build another thing. It's like, okay, this one's fun. People are still using that. I'll, like, help upkeep this one. But I had, like, a bunch of other ideas for stuff I was going to build too. So I just, like, I didn't, like, know how to think about what a company was going to be. And so I think there's something about maintaining flexibility that's helpful. You know, once you hire a bunch of people, you know, it's a lot easier when you can just have meetings in your own head about what direction you want to go in.

And it's, like, and there's a lot less pride and, like, people dug in when you're just, like, okay, I'm going to change direction. It's, like, you know, people haven't, like, invested their ego in, like, no, we were going in this direction. And, like, now I must be convinced. It's, like, nah, I just. So I do think that that's a thing where you want to, like, keep things lean and be able to do that. And that's one of the reasons why we tried to get the company back to being, you know, whatever the leanest version of a large company is that we can be.

But I do think that there's something to that where it's, like, it's obviously it's not super fun not having the resources to do what you want to do. But I think it also is problematic to have more people working on something than you should have for the stage that it's at. Because then the people who are working on it don't have the agency to actually, like, make the changes and do the things that they need to, which is less fun.

And then you can't attract the best people to go work on those things because it's less fun. And so I do think you just have to dial it right. You're spending a gajillion dollars on reality labs. It's a technical term. It's not making that much money. So I'm going to play Mark back to you of it's not appropriate to have all these people and resources working on things for more than the stage warrants. I'm being a little facetious here.

But I'm curious why you categorize it differently. I mean, well, I think some of the stuff by the time you're at the scale that we're at is also just about, like, what do you want to do over the next 10 to 20 years? And what do you think are going to be important? And, you know, we were talking about, like, making your own luck and all that and how, you know, it's like I think there are some broad strokes that we can have a sense of where things are going.

I'm pretty sure glasses and kind of, like, holographic presence and AR is going to be a completely ubiquitous product. Right. It's just like everyone who had a phone before replaced it with a smartphone and then a lot of more people got smartphones. If all we get is all the people in the world who already have glasses upgrading to glasses that have AI in them, then, like, this is already going to be one of the most successful products in the history of the world.

So and I think it's going to go a lot further than that. So I know there's that. There is the thing about controlling our own destiny. It's strategically valuable. You know, we did this calculation or estimate at some point where it's like how much money do we lose from our core family of apps to the various, like, taxes that the platforms have to, like, when they tell us we can't run the ad business the way that we think we should be able to, when they tell us we can't ship certain products so that way, like, people use the things less or like them less.

And it's hard to exactly estimate it, but I think we might be, like, twice as profitable if we own the platform or something. So I think from that perspective, that's worth a lot. Just from, like, a pure, like, dollars perspective, which is not primarily how I come at this stuff, but even, like, now I've learned a thing, or, actually, since the Yahoo days. And so now I at least am able to, like, I might not be able to convince all the investors that we should be investing to the extent that we are in Reality Labs if I didn't control the company.

But at least I can sort of articulate a case for why I am confident that it's going to be good over time. But for me, it's always been way more about the product experience and what you can enable and build. And, you know, one of the shifts, and this is sort of like a value shift over time, is, you know, one of the things that some of the early Oculus guys used to say to me, that there's a difference between building good things and awesome things.

And, like, good is good, right? It's helpful. It's useful. It's things that people use on a day-to-day basis because it adds something to their lives. But awesome is different. Awesome is uplifting and inspiring and just, like, leads you to just be way more optimistic about the future. And it's just, like, this uplifting thing about humanity. And so I think a lot of what we've done with social media so far is very good. Right? Right? We've built these products.

More than 3 billion people use them on a, you know, near daily basis. Right? It's like 3.3 billion on a daily basis. Yeah. Yeah. So, yeah. And so that's... And they use it because it is useful in their life. Right? And in all these different ways. I mean, obviously, people vary. People use it for different things. But it's useful. And it helps people. And it helps people stay connected. It helps people build businesses. It helps people form communities.

It's good. There aren't that many people on a day-to-day basis who get out of bed and are like, fuck yeah, social media. Like, it's like that's... Right? I mean, that's not like... So, I kind of think for the next... For my next stage, right? For the next stage of the company, the next like 15 years, I want us to build more things that are awesome in addition to things that are good. And I think that they both matter.

But to me, this is like a little bit of a... Kind of the next stage of what I want our company to stand for and be. And so, I think a lot of the reality lab stuff that we're doing is going to be in that bucket. A lot of the AI stuff that we're doing, I think, is going to be in that bucket. There are a bunch of things in the apps that are going to be in that bucket, too.

New apps, too. But I don't know. I think that there's just something that's like fundamentally pretty good about that. And that's... Maybe it's also just like where I am in my life, right? I'm like to think I'm young. I'm a little older, right? But it's like... I do think that at this point, it's not just a meta thing. Also, in my personal life, a lot of what I personally value is doing things that are inspiring with people who I find inspiring.

All right? And so, there's the personal version of this. It's like I get to work on interesting science problems with Priscilla and my wife and a bunch of awesome people. You know, I get to design shirts with some of the best fashion designers in the world, right? It's like I... Statues. Yeah, sculpture of my wife. Bring back the Roman tradition of designing sculptures of people you love. I'm not at all being facetious. Like, it's really cool.

No, but I mean, I think Daniel Arsham is like a really talented guy. And I was like, that's a person who I'd love to work with on something. Let's go find a project. You know, building... You know, I have... One of my side projects is, you know, we have this cattle ranch in Kauai. And I'm trying to see if we can raise the highest quality beef in the world. And there's like all this stuff. It's like starts with like...

It's awesome. We got this steer. Chunk. He's like... He's just the man. He's the man. We're having a hard time keeping him on the ranch because every time we put him in a steel enclosure and he sees a female cow, he busts through the steel enclosure. But I feel like that's the kind of bull that you want to make the highest quality beef in the world. And we're just working with, you know, trying to do really high quality, awesome things with awesome people.

That's like... If that's what I get to do for the next 15 or 20 years, then like... It's going to be a good 15 or 20 years. Was there a moment... Like, what changed? Like, when did this become your priority and why? I can't... It feels so radical that it... How could it have possibly been gradual? Or was this just like mark all the time and we just couldn't see the real mark? I don't know. I think that there might have been something around the way the company shifted in operations around COVID.

I mean, it's like the... COVID, like all these tech companies went remote temporarily. And it was an interesting period to just like get some more time, like a step back. I'm a pretty introverted person. And I do think it's... I need to be careful where like I get a lot of value and energy and ideas from being around other people. But I also need time with myself. And with COVID, I kind of got that. And it was a time of reflection where I was able to think about this stuff.

And we were also going through this very difficult political time in the country. And our company was at the center of a lot of those things. So that was a cause of a bunch of reflection. And then I think that a bunch of the things that we'd spun up earlier, but at smaller scale. Right? So the Reality Lab stuff that we started in 2014, really. The FAIR stuff around, you know, fundamental AI research. Yeah. 2012, 13?

2012, 13. AlexNet-ish. Sometime around then. These things, they kind of got started. And they were growing. And it kind of reached this moment, which is like, are we going to double down on this and do this? Or are we going to kind of like do this as a hobby? And I was like, no, I think we should do this. Right? I mean, this is going to be a really important part of what we do. And we had to make a really important set of decisions.

What we knew was going to be really painful, you know, to go double down on those things and build out the AI infrastructure that we needed to and scale up some of the Reality Lab stuff. And I knew that a lot of the investors would hate it, at least in the short term, before it's clearly the right thing to do. So what I didn't know was that at the time, I thought they were going to not like it.

But I thought it was going to be okay because I didn't think there was also going to be a recession at the same time. So that, like, really, it's like, I mean, look, like, you learn who you are through challenges. Right? It's like we had like a really, you know, it's like, okay, like, losing half of your market cap is quaint compared to losing 80% of your market cap or whatever it was. Right? It's, you know, so, but so, I mean, these are all intentional decisions.

Right? It's like, I mean, there are a lot of conversations that we had which are like, should we go forward with this? And the answer that I came out with is yes. This is what I believe in. I think this is going to be important for the world. I think it's going to work over time. We're no stranger to going through painful periods. In some ways, it makes the company better. Let's do it. Oh, well. We're starting to enter, looking at the clock, like, conclusion lightning round territory.

All right. I've had one like lurking in the back of my head. Yeah. It makes sense to me that you would rebrand the company something that is not Facebook, given how broad the family of apps was, that you've got, let's imagine you were going to rebrand it today. You've got AI going on. You've got AR going on. You've got VR going on. Would you pick the name Meta if you were going to rename the company today?

I like Meta. It's a good name. You know, finding good short names, I mean, this actually was a thing that we talked about for a while, because it was pretty clear that Facebook is continuing to grow in importance in the world, which I think a lot of people don't appreciate, and it's kind of mind-boggling at the scale that it's at. But the others, I mean, we went through a period where it's like we had Facebook and a handful of small apps.

And now we have like four apps that have a billion people or more using them, you know, hopefully in the next few years, five with threads, if that continues scaling. And this was a conversation that we had a bunch, where it's like, does it make sense for the name of the company to be one of the apps as the other apps, as it's really becoming a family of apps? And it was important to me, this was also coinciding with a lot of the challenges that we were having, right?

The political brand challenges, different things. And a lot of people were proposing that from the perspective of running away from the Facebook brand, right? They were like, oh, well, like, does the Facebook brand have issues? Do we need a new brand? And I was like, we don't run away from that, right? It's like, it might make sense one day to not have Facebook be the lead brand for the company because we do so many different things.

But I'm only going to do this when we come up with a brand that is going to be evocative of the future that we're trying to build, because we run towards something. We don't run away from things. And when we got to Meta, then I was like, all right, we're here. And it was around the time when we were doubling down on the investment and where there was all the controversy. And it's like, look, like, if we're doing this, we're going to lean into this and we're going to do it.

So let's do it. And if I were to make the case to you, I feel the core competency of Meta is you are able to discover products in the world. You have great ideas. You work on them. You discover interesting products. And you, Mark, are not someone who wants to define yourself by anything. You want to have, like, your hands on a bunch of great controls and maximize your degrees of freedom, see where the world's going, and then have the best freaking spaceship possible to go maneuver your way over there.

It seems like I would pick a brand that almost doesn't pigeonhole me into a specific future. I might be looking for something that's more like, look, I want to maximize my maneuverability. Yeah. I get it. But I don't know. That's just, I, we align around a vision and a mission of what we're trying to do and we run towards it. That's always been how we've operated. Yeah. And in many ways, doing what I just suggested would kind of be running.

It's like, well, we don't believe in it that much. And you're like, no. Yeah. No. I mean, we're a company that, like, puts a flag down around what we're doing and we're going to go do it. And it's like, put a wall in front of us, there's going to be a mark-shaped hole in the wall. Speaking of lightning rounds and mark-shaped holes, you are accelerating what used to be your annual challenges. I always, I mean, when we were all kids and we didn't know each other, I mean, I was so inspired.

You would do your annual challenges. You would post about them. And I was like, wow, that's like pretty damn cool. And then we all get a little older and we all have kids on the stage now and we all have companies on the stage now. And there's... Some large, some small. The demands on your time, like it, for me, especially, I think lots of people, that's like, that space gets sucked. And you have expanded it. How?

What do you mean? Well, you used to do annual challenges and I feel like you're now doing weekly challenges. Yeah, no, I actually was doing annual challenges. You're designing t-shirts, you're making sculptures, you're raising capital. I feel like you have a weekly challenge. I just like, I'm trying to, trying to do inspiring things. I mean, it's, yeah, I don't know. But I'm also really competitive. Who's your competition for this? What do you mean? I was just thinking about other things that I'm doing.

I'm like, what have I started doing? I got into all these more extreme sports and fighting and stuff. And I'm like, I don't know. I mean, we face a lot of competition and a lot of different aspects of what we do. I mean, there's the social media competitors. There's the platform competitors. I think Apple is a bigger competitor than people realize. They kind of think, hey, they're doing a different type of thing. But I don't know.

I think over the next 10, 15 years, I think that kind of like battle over, ideological battle over what should the architecture be of the next set of platforms? Are they going to be the closed integrated Apple, a model that Apple has always done? Again, I mean, there are multiple good ways to build things. So I think if you look at the different generations of computing, PCs, mobile, they've all had sort of a closed integrated version and an open version.

And the thing that I think there's just a ton of recency bias around is because iPhone basically won. I know that there are more Android phones out there. But I mean, but iPhone is sort of like the intellectual leader and by far like has all the problems. Let's take it as a concede. Yeah. Yeah. I know there's the recency bias and probably like almost everyone here has an iPhone. And I think that because of the recency bias, there's sort of this view that's like, oh, no, this is just the superior way to do things.

But I don't actually think that's a given. In the PC era, Windows with the open ecosystem was the leader. And part of my goal for the next 10, 15 years, the next generation of platforms is to build the next generation of open platforms and have the open platforms win. And I think that that's going to lead to a much more vibrant tech industry. Now, there are advantages of doing a closed and integrated model. I think Apple will have a place for sure.

I expect them to be our primary competitor. And I think it will not be just a product competition. I think it's like a, in some ways, very deeply values driven and ideological competition around what the future of the tech industry should be and how open these platforms, whether it's things like Lama and AI or the glasses or different things, should be for developers, like an individual, someone getting started in their dorm room like me, to not have to ask for permission to go build the next set of awesome things.

I've got a closing question here. Please. Thank you. So we have a lot of builders in the audience tonight, a lot of founders. We're in probably the most interesting technology environment since the early mobile days in terms of opportunity. It's been 20 years. You might have to go back a little bit. But what advice do you have for founders today on something that's different than trying to pattern match Mark Zuckerberg from 2004, given we live in a different world today?

Yeah, I don't know. I mean, just do something that you care about. And I mean, if you're trying to run our strategy, try to learn as quickly as you can. But I mean, if there's like, I think part of what I'm trying to say is, I think there are different ways to build stuff, right? It's like our way worked for me and our team. You know, it's different things have clearly worked for other companies. I don't know.

One day, my daughter, we went to, we went to, took her to a Taylor Swift concert. And she, she was like, you know, dad, I kind of want to be like Taylor Swift when I grew up. Hell yeah. I was like, you, you can't, but you can't, that's not available to you. I was like, but, and she, and she thought about it and she's like, all right, when I grow up, I want people to want to be like August Chan Zuckerberg.

And I was like, hell yeah. Hell yeah. So I think that that's, yeah, I don't know. I think it's like, look, learn from other people's successes and failures, but do your own thing. Love that. Love that. Well, that is the perfect place to leave things. We made you something that you already have a very amazing, well-designed shirt. I hope you have room in your life for more than one. I do. I used to only wear one type of shirt.

Now I've moved on. So David and I made you a custom one of one shirt that represents tonight. Thank you. It is size Zuck. So no one else can, you know, there's, it can never be made again. And we've got these coordinates on the back. The first one, GPS coordinates, GPS coordinates. The first one represents Kirkland house where you wrote the first line of code for Facebook. And the second one is the chase center. Awesome. So thank you for joining us here tonight.

Wow. What a night. Absolutely crazy. I mean, Mark has done many interviews this year, both with other podcasts and in traditional press, but that felt different. If for no other reason than it happened live in front of a 6,000 person audience in an arena, but I wasn't expecting it to feel that different. Yeah. I mean, it was, I think the wildest experience of my life being up there. I don't even know what else could compare. Pretty insane.

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Okay, so David, reflections on this conversation. The biggest thing that I kept thinking going into the night, as we're talking with Mark, as we're talking with his team, you know, people kept saying, we don't really do this. Mark doesn't really do this. And I kept thinking, yeah, he kind of does because he's done all these podcasts this year. And he does Facebook Meta Connect, like he's done big events before, of course. Right, and he does a good number of in-person press interviews, too.

It's not like he doesn't talk to the traditional press, even though that has kind of become a narrative. It's not really true. However, Mark has not done an external, several thousand person, live thing like this. This is a very unusual format and kind of an uncomfortable one, even for you and I. Like, we're so used to stopping, starting, being thoughtful in our answers. And like, this is a show. You're performing. There are no breaks. There's no retakes.

Yeah. Right. But Mark and like all the meta execs really embraced it. A bunch of the executive team came. Like, they took off this whole day and actually some stuff we did the night before, too. A bunch of the board members were there. A lot of people important to Mark were there. His family came. They made it an event. Right. I thought this was a big deal for us. I was kind of shocked to the degree that Mark also thought it was a big deal for him.

Which is super cool. Totally agree. That's one. I was also surprised and delighted that he was willing to dive into history with us. Yes. We totally did not expect that. He's so, like, usually so maniacally focused on the future. And in our conversations to prep with him before the event, he was like, I think of you guys as a history podcast. You know, let's talk about the future. I'm like, okay, okay. But we want to ground it in history.

And he showed up and was totally ready to go back. And I think that made the talking about the present and the future even better. Totally. Because you could create these through lines. I mean, as funny as your interjection on let's go back to the IPO moment was, it opened up the door to have, like, these comparative moments to is what Meta doing today. Is that similar to something that you've done over and over? Should we be watching for a pattern here?

Or are you very different today than you were historically? The way that he was talking about that stuff on stage felt very authentic. And I just haven't heard him speak in that way before, at least publicly. I think it was also a great way to let us all get a window into his psyche, which kind of brings us to another point, which is, like, he is still in it. Oh! What other founders of companies like that?

I mean, there's Jensen. Who else? You know, it's the two of them. Yeah, I think the casual observer to Meta might observe, like, you know, Mark's been running it for 20 years. And most of the time, these founders kind of, like, go and do something else. They become executive chairman or they, like, stepped into a board role or they own 4% of the companies. There's some pattern there. And for Mark, I think it was plain as day on stage.

He is more in it than ever. And I don't think he thinks he's, like, halfway through his journey. Like, I don't think he's 20 years in. Oh, at 40, I'll be done. I don't get that sense either. I think Meta is his vehicle by which he wants to live his entire life. And he wants to make things with this group of people that he wants to make, period. And that is kind of the product strategy. I got chills when he said the 20-year mistake.

And then I got even more chills when he said, but 20 years actually isn't that long. Yeah, it's a pretty illustrative comment. Totally. I was appreciative that he engaged with us on the Be Critical of the company. Because honestly, I was asking that as research for when we inevitably do our Meta episode. I think he gave us a regret, not a criticism. But we were live on stage in front of 6,000 people. And it's not really the right format for that.

Yep, totally. That said, obviously, a very interesting answer. I think related, though, back to the he's still in it, in some sense, Reality Labs, you could look at, like, his Blue Origin. A hundred percent. It's just within Meta. I'm glad you caught this, too. Other big tech CEO founders have their moment running the company. They take a board role. They go do another thing. And oftentimes it's big and important for the world and capital intensive. And Mark is doing that, but inside Meta with Reality Labs.

I think it'll be super fascinating 20 to 50 years from now to reflect back and say, what were the unintended or perhaps intended outcomes of commingling multiple huge swings under one corporate umbrella versus having people who are either CEO of multiple companies concurrently or, you know, step down from one to run the other. For Mark, I kind of feel like, again, Meta is his vehicle for executing the things that he thinks are awesome products. And, of course, it's not just awesome products, but, like, things that could let him have more control over his universe.

He's clearly a guy who values having a lot of degrees of freedom and doesn't like being boxed in. I loved your turn-based strategy game of get more turns, learn more on each turn. Like, oh, man, StarCraft Pro Player 101 there. Yes. But it'll be interesting to see the knock-on effects of having Reality Labs in the Meta organization versus as a new venture. Totally. All of that brings me to, you know, frankly, just my biggest overwhelming takeaway from the whole experience, which is, Ben, you've developed a really great research interview question that you use on all the sources that we talk to now, which is, you ask, what is the one thing that is most misunderstood about this company, this organization,

et cetera? And everybody at Meta, for years, always would say Mark. And I never totally got it until this evening. He's both a singular individual himself, but it's not just that. It's that a true superpower of the company is that it is architected from top to bottom legally, financially, organizationally. Culturally. Culturally to reflect and amplify his immense strengths. Which I think is probably true of, like, Apple, Steve Jobs, Bill Gates, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Jensen. Yes. But we are right up close to the ways in which Meta is a sort of an amplifier, almost like it's a way for you to take the gain on Mark's output and turn it up, you know, 10,000x.

Yes. And I think what was so striking about it to me versus, you're absolutely right, all those other companies, it is generally accepted in the public narrative about Apple under Steve Jobs, about NVIDIA under Jensen, that that is the case. I don't think it is about Meta and Mark. I don't think people understand that. I didn't understand that until this experience. Are you saying Meta is still very much a Mark Zuckerberg production? I'll see myself out.

Well put. There we go. Well, listeners, thank you so much for joining us on this journey. Come talk about it with us in the Slack, acquired.fm slash Slack. Would love to hear all of your thoughts as well. Join our email list, acquired.fm slash email. That will let you basically know every single time a new episode drops or when we are doing something like Chase Center again to be the first to know about that. God, if we ever do something like that again.

We've got a merch store. Check it out on acquired.fm. We've got ACQ2, our second show where we are always interviewing earlier stage companies than Meta, but where we think there are great, insightful conversations with founders and CEOs. And David, I know you've got some thank yous. One last thing. Final thank yous. Thank you to Mark. Thank you to basically the entire Meta executive team who helped with the evening. Thank you to Hermes for dressing us, which was my favorite Easter egg of the night.

Yes. So fun. Thank you to Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan Chase, and JPMorgan Payments for making it all possible. It was truly a dream come true. And that is because of our incredible partnership. Indeed it was. Well, listeners, we'll see you next time. Yes. In a couple of weeks with the full show, we are pumped to drop it. We'll see you next time. Who got the truth? Is it you? Is it you? Is it you? Who got the truth now?

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